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Abstract 
This paper proposes a new class of stratification indices that measure interdistributional 
inequality between multiple groups.  The class is based on a conceptualisation of 
stratification as a process that results in a hierarchical ordering of groups and therefore seeks 
to capture not only the extent to which groups form well-defined strata in the income 
distribution but also the scale of the resultant differences in income standards between them, 
where these two factors play the same role as identification and alienation respectively in the 
measurement of polarisation.  The properties of the class as a whole are investigated as well 
as those of selected members of it: the first two integer members may be interpreted as 
measuring the overall incidence and depth of stratification, while higher-order members are 
directly sensitive to the severity of stratification between groups.  An illustrative application 
provides an empirical analysis of global income stratification by regions in 1993. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of stratification is deeply embedded within sociology, most notably in relation to 
the analysis of social class, but has only been of relatively recent concern within the 
economics literature.  Thus Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) in their seminal article quote a 
definition by the sociologist Lasswell (1965, p.10): “In its general meaning a stratum is a 
horizontal layer, usually thought of as between, above or below other such layers or strata.  
Stratification is the process of forming observable layers, or the state of being comprised of 
layers.”  Key to this definition is the idea that stratification, unlike segregation, implies a 
hierarchical ordering of groups according to some metric where in many economic settings it 
will be possible to quantify the scale of the resultant differences in outcomes between groups.  
For example, occupational segregation in a labour market context will only lead to 
stratification in the earnings distribution if one group is crowded into lower paid occupations, 
with the resultant scale of economic disadvantage due to employment discrimination 
depending not only on the degree of segregation but also on the size of occupational pay 
differentials.  Conversely, direct wage discrimination may not lead to significant stratification 
if groups are distributed equally among higher and lower paid occupations.  In this paper we 
propose a class of stratification measures that depend in general on both the extent to which 
groups form well-defined layers or strata in the distribution of some economic outcome and 
the scale of between-group differences in those outcomes, since both are necessary 
consequences of the process of stratification.  For expositional purposes we refer to “income 
stratification” though the measures are equally applicable to consumption, wealth or earnings. 
 The measurement of stratification from our perspective requires a comparison of 
inequality between two or more distributions, rather than the conventional focus of inequality 
analysis on the dispersion of outcomes within one distribution, where this may be expected to 
generate additional insights into the relative economic position of different groups.  For 
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example, examining gender pay differentials over the whole of the wage distribution rather 
than just in terms of the average wage gap can shed more light on the nature of the 
disadvantage faced by women in the labour market (e.g. Jenkins, 1994; van Kerm 2013).  
Similarly, the comparison of income distributions by race in South Africa (e.g. Allanson and 
Atkins, 2005; Gradin, 2012) or by country in the world (e.g. Milanovic and Yitzhaki, 2002; 
Lakner and Milanovic, 2013) may be informative about the legacy of apartheid and the 
impact of globalisation respectively.   
A small but distinct literature on ‘interdistributional inequality’ has sought to develop 
graphical tools to facilitate such comparisons of distributions along with summary measures 
of economic distance between them (see Deutsch and Silber (1999) for an overview).  One 
major limitation of this literature is that it is very largely restricted to the comparison of one 
distribution with another.
2
 Thus, whereas the standard tools for the decomposition of 
inequality by population group yield measures of between-group inequality that are 
applicable to two or more groups, all but one of the summary measures of economic distance 
or group disadvantage reviewed in Yalonetsky (2012) are only applicable to pairwise 
comparisons.  The sole exception is the class of ‘ethical distance functions‘ in which an 
equally distributed equivalent (EDE) income standard
3
 is first computed for each distribution 
and then the two income standards are compared (Shorrocks, 1982).  The main contribution 
of this paper is to propose a class of indices that is both applicable to multiple groups and 
more informative about the nature of interdistributional inequality than ethical distance 
functions.  
                                                          
2
 See, for example, Bishop et al. (2010).  Andreoli and Zoli (2012) provides a recent exception but does not 
proceed to define any corresponding multilateral summary indices. 
3 An income standard summarizes an entire distribution as a single ‘representative income’ level and should 
ideally satisfy various axioms including linear homogeneity and sub-group consistency (see Foster et al., 2013). 
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The indices are built up by aggregating the economic distance between each distinct 
pair of distributions in the population of interest to yield a class of measures that are defined 
as weighted averages with weights that depend solely on group frequencies.  These measures 
are given in general as increasing functions of both the extent to which groups constitute 
distinct strata in the income distribution and between-group differences in income standards, 
where these two factors play the same role as identification and alienation respectively in the 
measurement of polarisation (Esteban and Ray, 1994; Duclos et al., 2004).  An important 
difference is that pairwise identification in our approach is equal to the difference in the odds 
that the income of a randomly chosen member of the richer group is more rather than less 
than that of a randomly selected member of the poorer group, rather than being a function of 
relative frequencies within income classes or at particular levels of income.  We therefore 
refer to our proposed class of measures as stratification rather than polarisation indices, 
although the two sets of measures do exhibit similar properties in many respects.  
Alienation between each pair of groups is in turn defined as a power function of the 
absolute difference in income standards between them, where the choice of power determines 
the ‘disadvantage’ sensitivity of the measure.  Analogously to the interpretation of Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures (Foster et al., 1984), the first two integer members 
of the class may be interpreted as measuring the overall incidence and depth of stratification, 
while higher-order members are directly sensitive to the severity of stratification between 
groups in the population.  More specifically, the first member may be interpreted as the 
population weighted mean difference in the odds that the income of a randomly chosen 
member of a richer group is more rather than less than that of a randomly selected member of 
a poorer group.  The second further takes into account the depth of stratification and can be 
represented graphically on a generalised Lorenz curve diagram given that it is simply equal to 
the absolute Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) between-group Gini index if the income standard is 
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specified as the arithmetic mean.  Higher-order members measure alienation as convex 
functions of pairwise income standard gaps and are therefore directly sensitive to the 
distribution of disadvantage among pairs of groups.   
The paper is organised as follows.  The next section introduces some basic notation 
and definitions employed in the paper.  Section 3 focuses on the choice of a suitable measure 
of stratification in the two group case for which aggregation is not an issue.  Section 4 
extends the analysis to more than two groups, obtaining the new class of multilateral 
stratification indices by aggregation of the pairwise indices.  Consideration is given to the 
properties of both the class as a whole and specific members of it.  Section 5 compares the 
new class of indices with the Yitzhaki (1994) overlapping measures and briefly considers the 
properties of two sets of related measures based on alternative normalisations of the 
alienation function.  Section 6 provides an empirical illustration based on the Milanovic and 
Yitzhaki (2002) analysis of world inequality in 1993 by regions.  The final section 
summarises the contribution and offers some suggestions for further research. 
 
2.  Notation and definitions 
We consider a population divided into K≥2 mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups that are 
ordered by some income standard from the poorest to the richest group.  Let kY , ( )k kF Y , 
( )k kf Y , kn , kp , k , ks  and k  represent respectively the income variable, cumulative 
distribution function, probability density function, population, population share, expected 
value, income share and income standard of group k (k=1,…K).  The overall population 
1 2u KY Y Y Y    is the union of all groups with size kkN n , distribution function 
( ) ( )u u k k kkF Y p F Y  and expected value u k kk p  .  All incomes are assumed to be 
positive to allow for the general definition of income standards.  The (fractional) ranking of 
group k incomes in the group l and overall income distributions are given as ( )l kF Y  and 
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( )u kF Y  respectively, with corresponding mean ranks klF  and kuF .  Assuming continuity of 
the income distributions, P( )k l klY Y F   denotes the probability that the income of a random 
member of group k is more than that of a random member of group l, where this is known as 
the probability of transvariation (Gini, 1916, 1959) if groups are ordered by the arithmetic 
mean of income with k and l denoting the poorer and richer groups respectively.
4
  If two or 
more groups have identical income standards then they are ranked such that 
P( ) 0.5 P( )k l l kY Y Y Y     for all relevant pairwise comparisons, where this secondary 
criterion for ranking distributions will generate a transitive ordering if the probability 
relationship between the sub-set of groups exhibits mutual rank transitivity (see De Baets et 
al., 2010).5  Finally if the two distributions cannot be ranked on the basis of either criteria (e.g. 
if the two income distributions are identical) then the various indices to be considered below 
are invariant to the ordering of the groups, which is therefore chosen arbitrarily.  
Following Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982), the conventional group-wise 
decomposition of the Gini index  2cov , ( )u u u uG Y F Y   may be written as 
W BG G G R    where W k k kkG p s G  with  2cov , ( )kk k k k kG Y F Y   denoting the 
Gini index of group k; 0.5B k l l k uk lG p p      ; and the residual R is interpreted as 
an ‘interaction effect’.  The alternative decomposition of Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) yields 
the identity w bG G G   where w k kukG s G  with  2cov , ( )ku k u k kG Y F Y  ; and 
  2 0.5b k k u ku ukG p F     .  Following Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991), Yitzhaki 
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 Continuity is assumed for notational convenience, implying that the probability of a randomly chosen member 
of group k having the same income as a randomly selected member of group l will have measure zero.  The 
treatment of ties is discussed below in footnote 8. 
5
 The need for the transitivity condition arises iff there are more than two groups with the same income standard 
given that P( ) 0.5l kY Y   and P( ) 0.5m lY Y   does not necessarily imply P( ) 0.5m kY Y  .  The empirical 
significance of the issue is likely to be limited but the condition can always be checked should the need arise.   
Note that ku luF F  does not imply P( ) 0.5k lY Y   so ranking in ascending order of average ranks in the overall 
distribution may not be sufficient to order groups that are distinguishable on a pairwise basis.   
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(1994) sets out to measure stratification in terms of the relationship between the within-group 
measures kkG  and kuG , whereas the class of indices defined in this paper build on links that 
have recently been established between the between-group indices BG  and bG .  We discuss 
the construction of the new class of indices in the following two sections and compare them 
with the Yitzhaki (1994) overlapping measures in Section 5.  
 
3.  The choice of stratification measure in the two group case 
This section proposes a class of pairwise stratification measures that are defined as the 
product of an identification index and an alienation function.  We first consider the choice 
and properties of the identification index, which is a modified version of the Gastwirth (1975) 
index of earnings differentials, before proceeding to the specification of the class of 
stratification indices.   
Gastwirth (1975) considers the problem of comparing male and female earning 
distributions in the light of the observation that men earn more than women on average, 
proposing a measure of earnings differentials TPROB that is equal to twice the ‘probability 
that a randomly chosen woman earns at least as much as a randomly selected man’ (p.32).  In 
our notation, the index is defined by Gastwirth as    1 1 2 2 20 12 F Y fTPROB Y Y

     with 
groups 1 and 2 referring to women and men respectively.  TPROB provides a unit free 
measure that will take a minimum value of zero if the highest paid women earns less than the 
lowest paid man and an “ideal” value of one when the two earnings distributions are 
identical.  Gastwirth (1975, p.33) argues that TPROB “will detect any advancement of 
women relative to men”6 and is therefore superior to measures such as the Theil (1971) 
overlap measure     1 1 2 20 min ,OVL f Y f Y y

  ,
7
 which is only sensitive to movements 
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 This is not strictly accurate.  See below for further discussion. 
7
 Following Deutsch and Silber (1997), Anderson et al. (2009) consider OVL as a polarization measure.   
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across the income level(s) at which the density functions intersect, and the ratio of medians 
which is open to similar criticism. 
We consider here the complementary index 12 1I TPROB   as a measure of the degree 
of identification of the two groups in a binary setting.  Given continuity of the income 
distributions,  12 1 21 2PI Y Y        1 2 1 21 P PY Y Y Y        2 1 1 2P PY Y Y Y    so the 
index may be interpreted as the difference in the odds that a randomly chosen man will 
receive more rather than less than a randomly selected woman.
8
  It follows immediately that 
the index is symmetric since 12 21I I  .  12I  will take its maximum value of 1 if the two 
groups are fully identified in the sense that group membership can be unequivocally 
determined from an individual’s position in the income distribution: no man will earn less 
than any woman if there is complete segregation of the groups into separate layers in the 
income distribution so not only are all men among the highest earners but also all the highest 
earners are men.  Conversely 12I  will equal zero if the two distributions are identical such that 
knowledge of an individuals’ position in the income distribution is entirely uninformative of 
their group identity: a randomly chosen man is equally likely to earn more rather than less 
than a randomly selected woman if the two groups are indistinguishable.   
12I  has appeared in the recent literature both as a measure of discrimination (Le 
Breton et al., 2008, 2012) and of the loss of between-group inequality due to overlapping 
(Monti and Santoro, 2011).  Le Breton et al. (2008) obtain the result that 12I  is equal to the 
first-order discrimination index   
1 1
1 0
2 q q dq    where     1 12 1q F F q   is 
interpreted as a first-order discrimination curve and defined as the proportion of men with 
incomes no more than the female income quantile associated with the poorest proportion q of 
                                                          
8
 Note that if  1 2P 0Y Y   then the definition of the identification indices may be extended to give 
   12 1 2 1 2[ ]1 2 P 0.5PI Y Y Y Y      and    21 2 1 1 2[ ]1 2 P 0.5PI Y Y Y Y      such that 
   12 2 1 1 2 21P PI Y Y Y Y I       as before, with this treatment also providing a feasible solution to the 
problem of ties in empirical work. 
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women: for example, if  1 0.5 0.2   then only 20% of men have incomes no more than the 
female median income.  Figure 1 illustrates  1 q  which is an ‘interdistributional Lorenz 
curve of the first type’ (Butler and McDonald, 1987) and takes the form of an increasing 
function that will coincide with the 45º line only if the two distributions are identical.  1  is 
defined as twice the area between this diagonal and  1 q with portions of  1 q  below the 
diagonal counting positively to the measure while those above it contribute negatively.  Thus 
1  provides a measure of ‘net’ discrimination, with  
1 q  only lying everywhere below the 
diagonal if male incomes first-order stochastically dominate female incomes, and may equal 
zero even if the two distributions are not identical (see Yalonetsky, 2012).  1  is responsive 
to changes in individual male and female incomes over the common support of the two 
distributions but not, for example, to progressive income transfers between women receiving 
less than the lowest male income min
2y  or between men with more than the highest female 
income max1y . 
 Monti and Santoro (2011) show that the ratio of the alternative between-group Gini 
indices bG  and BG  is equal to  12 1 2/ 1 2Pb BI G G Y Y     in the two group case, and 
follow Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002, p.161) in interpreting the index in terms of the loss of 
between-group inequality due to overlapping.  In particular, 12I  will take its maximum value 
of one when the two groups occupy exclusive income ranges such that there is perfect 
stratification in the sense of Lasswell (1965).  It is also shown that the minimum value of 12I  
is not zero since bG , unlike BG , can be negative when mean incomes by group are 
negatively correlated with mean ranks. 
Monti and Santoro (2011) proceed to give a graphical interpretation of 12I  similar to 
that in Le Breton et al. (2008, 2012) but the link with between-group Gini indices suggests an 
alternative representation in terms of Lorenz and concentration curves that will prove useful 
in the multilateral case.  Specifically, if we consider the smoothed distribution 
k
Y obtained   
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Figure 1  Construction of first-order discrimination curve  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Le Breton et al. (2012) 
 
Figure 2  Representation of 12I  based on Lorenz and concentration curves  
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by assigning to each individual in the population the mean income of the group to which they 
belong then 
1 1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )k kF Y p F p F    
,  2cov , ( )
k k kB u
G Y F Y     is the Gini index of 
smoothed income and  2cov , ( )
kb u u u
G Y F Y   is the concentration index of smoothed 
income with ranks based on the original income distribution.  Hence 12I  is in general equal to 
the ratio of the concentration index to the Gini index for the smoothed distribution.  Figure 2 
plots the proportion of smoothed income received by the first 100q per cent of people when 
ranked from poorest to richest in the smoothed and original distributions, ( )
k
L q  and 
( )
k
C q  respectively, with 12I  equal to the ratio of area A to area (A+B) if ( )kC q  lies 
everywhere below the line of equality.   
Given the identification index 12I , an obvious candidate for a stratification index in 
the binary case is the absolute between-group inequality measure 
 12 2 1 12u b u BG G I I       where, following Esteban and Ray (1994),  2 1 0    
may be interpreted as a measure of alienation between groups.  In practice, we employ a 
generalised alienation function  12 ,A    that yields the following class of pairwise 
stratification indices: 
             12 12 12 2 1 2 1 1 2, , P P ; 0; 0 1S A I Y Y Y Y

                   (1) 
where    
 
1
1
0 1
; 1,2
0
j
j
j
n
iji
j
j j
n
n
iji
y
if
n j
y if




  

 
       

 



, (1a) 
Thus alienation  12 ,A    is given as a power function of the difference in income standards 
between the groups and will be non-negative by definition since    2 1 0     by 
construction.  Income standards  j   are defined as generalised or α−order means and 
may therefore be interpreted, following Blackorby et al. (1981), as social welfare measures 
with  being the Atkinson (1970) inequality aversion parameter.  The parameter   may be 
interpreted as an indicator of “group disadvantage” aversion in that a society in which the gap 

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in income standards between the two groups is twice as large will have 2  times the level of 
stratification for any given degree of pairwise identification.  Alternatively,   is the elasticity 
of stratification with respect to the income standard gap, so that a 1% increase in the gap 
leads to a % increase in between-group stratification ceteris paribus.  In general there seems 
no reason to believe that aversion to individual income inequality and to group disadvantage 
will be the same so   and  are treated as independent parameters.   
The parametric class of measures  12 ,S    gives analysts and policymakers an 
instrument to evaluate stratification with varying sensitivity to distributional issues depending on 
social preferences. In particular,  2 1 12 u bI G       2 1 1 22 Pu BG Y Y       is 
obtained as a special case when 1   , where the final term may be interpreted as a 
measure of the loss of absolute between-group inequality due to overlapping.  Additional 
flexibility can be gained through the normalisation of the alienation function, which is considered 
in Section 5 following the generalisation of the stratification index to allow for multiple groups. 
 
4. Generalisation to the case of two or more groups  
This section considers the generalisation of the pairwise measures  12 ,S    to provide a 
class of multilateral stratification indices that are applicable to two or more groups.  The key 
to our approach is to build up the multilateral indices by aggregating the pairwise indices 
over each distinct pair of distributions so as to yield an overall index that is a weighted 
average of the pairwise indices.  The pairwise index provides an attractive building block for 
this purpose as the contribution of each pair of groups to the value of the overall measure can 
be interpreted in a straightforward manner given the inherent symmetry of  12 ,S   .  
Following the definition of the new class of multilateral stratification indices, we explore the 
properties of both the class as a whole and specific members of it.   
 
  


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4.1 Definition of the class of indices   
Let    , ,kl kl klS A I     be the pairwise index for two groups l k  such that
  0l k     by definition.  We propose the following class of multilateral indices: 
     
      
    
, , , ; 0; 0 1
P P
sgn( ) P P ;
kl kl kl klk l k k l k
kl l k l k k lk l k
k
kl l k l k k lk l k
k l
S p S A I
p Y Y Y Y
p
p l k Y Y Y Y
p p

 
 
       
 
 
 


    
    
 
      
 
   
 
 
 (2) 
where 
2
2 2
;
1
k l k l
kl lk
k l jk l k j
p p p p
p p
p p p

  
    
        
 (2a) 
  
1 0
sgn
1 0
if l k
l k
l k
 
  
  
. (2b) 
Thus  ,S    is a population weighted average of the pairwise indices  ,klS    with non-
negative weights klp  that are defined to sum to one over the set of distinct pairs of groups, 
i.e. for all l k .  Hence, klp  may be interpreted as the probability that two individuals 
randomly selected with replacement from the population will be members of groups k and l 
conditional on them not being members of the same group.  The third line of (1) follows since 
kl lkI I   and    l k k l          , with the use of the sign function sgn( )l k  allowing 
for the possibility that     P Pl k k lY Y Y Y    may be less than zero even if l k , and 
makes use of the convention that the relative contribution of each group to the pairwise 
weight klp  is in proportion to group sizes. 
 
4.2  General properties of the class of indices   
For two or more groups the properties of  ,S    are as follows: 
(I) Normalisation 
The index  ,S    is normalised to take a value of zero if for each pair of groups then 
either 0klI   or  , 0klA     or  , 0kl klA I    .  Thus stratification will only be 
non-zero if there is at least one pair of groups that is both identified to some extent and 
14 
 
consists of groups with non-identical income standards.  Conversely, as with the binary 
index, zero values do not necessarily imply that all distributions are identical. 
The index will be unit free with a maximum value of one if the disadvantage 
aversion parameter   is set equal zero.  Otherwise  ,S    is unbounded from either 
above or below with the same units as  ,klA   .  To see that negative values of 
 ,S    are possible with multiple groups, consider a population that consists of three 
groups k, l, and m with population shares of 2/5, 1/5 and 2/5 respectively and incomes 
Yk={5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5}; Yl={3, 9, 9} and Ym={4, 4, 4, 4, 13, 13} measured in dollars.  Hence 
k l m    , with 5k  , 7l   and 9m  ; and 1/ 3klI  , 1/ 9lmI   and 
1/ 3kmI    since  P 1/ 3k lY Y  ,  P 4 / 9l mY Y   and  P 2 / 3k mY Y  .  For the 
first three integer members of the class with 1  , we obtain from (2) that 
 0,1 1/18S   ,  1,1 4 / 9S    dollars and  2,1 20 / 9S    dollars squared.  
(II) Invariance axioms 
a. Symmetry:  ,S    is unaffected by the permutation of groups 
b. Population replication:  ,S    is invariant to the replication of the population 
within each group while holding the population shares of the groups constant.   
c. Income measurement invariance: The pairwise identification indices klI  are 
invariant to affine transformations of individual welfare levels,
9
 while the 
alienation functions  ,klA    are homogeneous of degree   in the difference in 
income standards   0l k    .  Hence  ,S    is invariant to affine 
transformations of individual welfare levels if 0   and translation invariant 
otherwise, with these properties extending to invariance in individual incomes if 
additionally 1  .  Alternative normalisations of  ,klA   , to be discussed in the 
                                                          
9
 Note that the klI ’s are not in general invariant to order-preserving transformations of individual welfare levels 
because such transformations can have an effect on identification through the ordering of groups by income 
standards. 
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next section, yield stratification measures that are invariant to scalar and affine 
transformations with 0  .   
d. Continuity:  Assuming continuous income distribution functions than  ,S    
will be continuous for all 0  .  In the case of  0,S   a small change in an 
individual income that leads to a change in the ordering of groups by income 
standards may give rise to a discontinuous change in the value of index, where 
this property is similar to the discontinuity of the FGT poverty measure P(0) at 
the poverty line when a small change in income takes an individual either above 
or below the line.  In all other cases the transition will be smooth because 
pairwise stratification tends to zero as the difference in income standards between 
the pair of groups tends to zero.  
(III) Dominance axioms: The dominance properties of the index may be characterised in 
terms of identification and alienation axioms, as in Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos 
et al. (2004).  For the sake of generality the discussion is couched in terms of the 
distribution of welfare and income standards, rather than of income and mean incomes: 
the two approaches coincide for the sub-class of indices with 1  , i.e.  ,1S  .  
a. Identification: We define the identification axiom with reference to a population 
consisting of two or more groups with symmetric, unimodal welfare densities 
with compact supports ( )k kf Y
  and corresponding income standards k
 .10  The 
need to define the population to which the axiom applies reflects the absence of 
simple stratification dominance properties that might apply to all populations, 
unlike the corresponding dominance axioms - such as the Pigou-Dalton transfer 
principle - in inequality analysis.  In particular, identification is inherently a 
                                                          
10
 Symmetry implies that ( ) ( )k k k kf w f w
     for all [0, ]kw
  and unimodality that (Y )k kf

is non-
decreasing on [0, ]k
 . 
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characteristic of groups so the impact on identification of any particular change in 
individual welfare levels will inevitably depend on the configuration of groups in 
the population (see Esteban and Ray (1994) for further discussion). 
 Given this setting, a symmetric, income standard-preserving “squeeze” in 
the welfare distribution of one group, as shown in Figure 3a, cannot reduce 
identification and hence stratification.  As in the measurement of polarisation (cf. 
Esteban and Ray, 1994), it is the identification axiom that distinguishes 
stratification from inequality, since a reduction in within-group variation holding 
between-group differences constant will lead to a fall in inequality according to 
the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.   
 More specifically, we follow Duclos et al. (2004) in defining a λ-squeeze of 
the density ( )k kf Y
 as:   
 11
( ) ; 0 1
k k
k k k
Y
f Y f
 
    
 
  
   
 
 
  (3) 
where ( )k kf Y
   is also symmetric and has the same income standard as ( )k kf Y
  
but is second-order stochastically dominant.  To see that  ,S    cannot fall due 
to a λ-squeeze note that the contribution of group k to overall stratification can be 
written from (2) as: 
 , sgn( ) ;kk kl l k kl
k ll k
p
S p l k I
p p
    

 
   
 
  (4) 
which will not fall if the degree of identification of group k does not fall with 
respect to either poorer or richer groups, i.e. the pairwise indices klI  do not fall if 
l k  and do not rise if k l .   
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Figure 3a.  Income-standard preserving “squeeze” of group k welfare distribution 
 
Figure 3b.  Graphical proof of identification axiom 
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 We demonstrate that the condition will hold in the former case in which 
( ) 0l k
    ,11 with extension to the latter case immediate given the symmetry 
assumptions.  The proof is illustrated in Figure 3b which shows the original and 
squeezed group k distribution functions ( )k kF Y
  and ( )k kF Y
   respectively.  Note 
that ( ) ( )k k k kF Y F Y
    if k kY
   and vice versa, with the absolute difference 
between the two curves being symmetric about the income standard given the 
symmetry of the welfare distributions.  For l k , we need to show that
0
[ ( ) ( )] ( )2 0k k k k l l lkl kl F Y F Y f Y YI I
     

    , where kl klI I
   is a weighted sum 
of the differences at each welfare level with weights given by the group l welfare 
density  l lf Y .  Consider first the limiting case l k    in which the weights 
 l lf Y  will also be symmetric about the common income standard such that 
0kl klI I
    by construction, with both 0klI
   and 0klI  .  For l k
   , the mode 
of  l lf Y  will lie to the right of k , as shown in the diagram, and we can 
proceed to sign kl klI I
   as follows.  First note that  l lf Y  is strictly increasing 
over the range ( )k l k
       so    l k l kf w f w      for any pair of points 
k w
   with 0 ( )l kw
     .  Moreover  l lf Y  is symmetric about the mode 
at l
  so it will also be the case that    l k l kf w f w      for any pair of 
points k w
   for which ( )l kw
    .  Hence we can conclude that 
0kl klI I
    since    l k l kf w f w      for all possible w. 
 Finally, it should be recognised that the characterisation of identification is 
substantially different in the measurement of stratification and polarisation 
despite the superficial similarities.  In particular, Duclos et al. (2004) apply the 
                                                          
11
 Le Breton et al. (2008) seek to establish an analogous relationship between second-order stochastic 
dominance and second-order discrimination (i.e. identification in our terminology) but only manage to show that 
it will hold if the density of the reference function ( )l lf Y
  is decreasing over the entire support of ( )k kF Y
 , 
implying that the group l distribution must be positively skewed with mode of zero.  
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“squeeze” operator to so-called “basic densities” that would be fully identified in 
our framework even before the application of the operator because they are 
assumed to have disjoint supports.  More generally, the identification function (4) 
for any group k depends in our approach on the extent to which group 
membership can be determined from individuals’ ranks within the income 
distribution rather than on the density ( )k kf Y
  at any given welfare level.  This 
difference fundamentally distinguishes the measurement of income stratification 
between a set of exogenously classified groups from that of income polarisation 
whether with or without predetermined groups.  
b.  Alienation:  The specification of the alienation axiom is more straightforward as 
it will apply to any population consisting of two or more groups.  Given the 
invariance properties of the pairwise identification indices 
klI  and the 
homogeneity in welfare levels of the alienation functions  ,klA   , an 
identification-preserving scalar expansion of all welfare differences about the 
overall population income standard u
  will unambiguously increase alienation.  
Thus we define a global or γ−spread of population welfare levels uY
  as: 
 ( ) ; 1u u u uY Y             (5) 
where ( )uY
   will have the same population income standard u
  as uY
  but give 
rise to higher levels of alienation and hence stratification if 1  .  Figure 4 
illustrates the idea of a γ−spread about the population mean u
 , clearly 
capturing the idea that stratification is an increasing function of between-group 
differences in income standards.  The parallel with the polarisation literature is 
again clear but, in the spirit of FGT poverty measures, we additionally allow for 
different degrees of group disadvantage aversion through the choice of the 
parameter  .   
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Figure 4.  Illustration of alienation axiom 
(A)  Original welfare levels 
 
(B)  γ-spread welfare levels 
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(IV) Decomposability and population composition:  The index  ,S    is a weighted 
average of the pairwise stratification indices  , ,klS    which provide estimates of the 
contribution of each distinct pair of groups to overall stratification.  Furthermore, the 
pairwise indices may be meaningfully aggregated, given symmetry, to yield unique 
estimates  ,kS    of the contribution of each group to overall stratification using (4).  
 Overall stratification will unambiguously rise if stratification between any pair of 
groups increases holding population shares constant.  Nevertheless it is important to 
remember that stratification is a property of groups and therefore not independent of the  
partition of the population into groups.
12
  For example, splitting one group into two or 
more sub-groups that each possesses the same income distribution as the parent group 
will lead to a fall in the population average level of stratification  ,S    given that 
 , 0klS     by definition for all pairs of sub-groups.  By extension  ,S    is not 
invariant to the replication of the population by the replication of groups.   
For any given set of K groups with income distributions ( )k kF Y , stratification 
will be maximised if the population is equally divided between the two groups with the 
largest pairwise index  ,klS   .  In the case of  0,S   this will be the pair of groups 
that exhibits the highest degree of differentiation from each other into separate layers as 
measured by the pairwise identification indices 
klI , where this pair may usually be 
expected to consist of the richest and poorest groups in the population although this 
need not always be the case.  For 0  , stratification will also depend on the degree of 
alienation and it will more likely be the case that  ,klS    will be maximised with the 
population equally split between the richest and poorest groups, given that these two 
groups must exhibit the greatest alienation as measured by the pairwise alienation 
                                                          
12
  We have previously noted a link between the measurement of stratification and between-group inequality: 
subgroup consistency in the measurement of inequality requires overall inequality, not the within-group and 
between-group components, to be invariant to the partition. 
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functions  ,klA   .  The parallel with the measurement of polarisation is once again 
obvious (cf. Estaban and Ray, 1994, p.837) 
 
4.3  Properties of  0,S   
The first member of the class,  0,S  , may be re-written from (1) as: 
        0, P 1 2 P ;kl kl kl l k k l kl k l
k l k k l k k l k
S p I p P Y Y Y Y p Y Y
  
           (6) 
where  0,S   is the population-weighted average level of pairwise identification since 
1klk l k p   by definition.  More explicitly,  0,S   measures the difference in the odds 
that the income of a randomly chosen member of a richer group is more rather than less than 
that of a randomly selected member of a poorer group, where groups are first ordered by 
income standards k
  and then by pairwise comparison of ranks in the case of tied groups.  
Alternatively, the index is equal to one less twice the population weighted average probability 
that a randomly chosen member of a poorer group receives more than a randomly selected 
member of a richer group.   
Thus  0,S   may be interpreted as a headcount or incidence measure of stratification 
that captures the extent to which individuals’ positions within the income distribution are 
determined by group membership: if group membership is entirely uninformative as a 
predictor of relative rank then  0, 0S   , whereas if membership of a particular group 
restricts individuals to a single interval or range of ranks exclusively occupied by members of 
their own group then  0, 1S   .  With only two groups, the reduction in headcount 
stratification caused by a unit increase in individual welfare levels would be greatest for 
members of the poorer group with incomes equal to the modal welfare level in the richer 
group.  With more than two groups, the issue is more complicated as there is a need to 
consider which group to target as well as to identify which members of the targeted group to 
support, where this will depend for intermediate groups on the net change in identification 
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due to unit changes in individual welfare levels.  Nevertheless it is readily apparent that 
increasing the welfare of the poorest group, let alone the welfare of the poorest members of 
that group, will not necessarily have the most impact on headcount stratification: indeed 
 0,S   is invariant to changes in the incomes of individuals in the poorest group who receive 
less than the lowest income level in any other group so long as these changes do not increase 
any of their incomes above that level.  
Zhou (2012) has independently proposed a stratification measure SZHOU that is identical 
to  0,S   except that the groups are ordered by kuF  alone on the assumption of no ties 
between groups.  Zhou defends his choice of measure on the grounds that it is invariant to all 
rank-preserving transformations of income but this is achieved by conflating the 
determination of the hierarchical ordering of groups with the measurement of the degree of 
identification between them given that 
ku l kll
F p F .
13
  In our view these are independent 
steps with income standards providing a more compelling primary criterion for the 
establishment of the relative economic standing of groups.  Nevertheless SZHOU will prove 
useful in applications in which only an ordinal measure of wellbeing is available such that is 
not possible to calculate representative welfare levels as a basis for ordering groups.   
The main virtue of the headcount index is that it is easy to understand as it only 
depends on the extent to which groups form more or less distinct strata and not on the 
associated differences in income standards.  But stratification is more than identification and 
alienation must also be taken into account in order to obtain an index that fully captures the 
richness of the concept. 
                                                          
13
 Zhou further conjectures that SZHOU≥0, which would imply that the index is bounded within the unit interval. 
However the following variant on the main text example shows this not to be the case: let the population shares 
of the three groups k, l, and m be 4/14, 3/14 and 7/14 with incomes Yk={5, 5, 5, 5}; Yl={3, 9, 9} and Ym={4, 4, 4, 
4, 13, 13, 13} then lu ku muF F F   since 
1
27kuF  , 
1
37luF   and 
4
77muF  . Hence 7 / 21lkI   , 
5 / 21lmI   and 3/ 21kmI   , since  P 2 / 3l kY Y  ,  P 8 / 21l mY Y   and  P 4 / 7k mY Y  , to give 
3/ 61ZHOUS   .   
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4.4  Properties of  1,S   
The second member of the class,  1,S  , may be re-written from (1) as: 
          
      
1, 1, P P
0, cov 1, ,
kl kl kl kl l k l k k l
k l k k l k
kl kl
S p A I p Y Y Y Y
S D A I
    
  
 
     
 
 
 (7) 
where    kl l kk l kD p
   

    is the population mean income standard gap and 
          cov 1, , 0,kl kl kl l k klk l kA I p D I S           is the population 
covariance between pairwise income standard gaps and identification indices.  
 1,S   is again interpretable as a population weighted average but the contribution 
that any particular pair of groups makes to the value of the overall index now depends not 
only on the pairwise identification index klI  but also on the (absolute) difference in income 
standards between them.  For example, the lack of overlap between a rich and a poor group 
will count more towards the ‘stratification gap’ as measured by  1,S   than the same lack 
between two moderately well-off groups: in the limit, two groups with identical income 
standards will not figure at all however large the difference in odds that a randomly chosen 
member of one group will be better off than a randomly selected member of the other group.   
 1,S   therefore reflects not only the incidence but also the depth of stratification, 
differentiating between pairs of groups on the basis of the size of the income standard or 
disadvantage gap between them.  More specifically, the last line of (7) shows that  1,S   is 
equal to the product of the mean levels of identification  0,S   and alienation  D  , plus 
the covariance between pairwise alienation and identification which will typically be positive.  
With only two groups, the reduction in the stratification gap caused by a unit increase in 
individual welfare levels would again be greatest for members of the poorer group with 
incomes equal to the modal welfare level in the richer group.  And, more generally, it will 
also be the case that increasing the welfare of members of the poorest group may not 
necessarily have the most impact on the stratification gap given that alienation is a linear 
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function of the income standard gap.  For the specific index  1,1S , it may be noted that the 
minimum cost of eliminating alienation through a policy of group-specific lump sum 
transfers will be equal to  K k kk K n    if transfers were perfectly targeted, i.e. the sum 
over all but the richest group of the product of the mean income gap with the richest group 
and group size.   
Allanson (2014) has recently generalised the Monti and Santoro (2011) result on the 
relationship between bG  and BG  to more than two groups, implicitly identifying  1,1S  in 
the process as 2cov( , ( ))
ku b u u
G Y F Y   where kY is the smoothed distribution defined in the 
previous section.  This correspondence suggests a graphical interpretation of  1,1S  along 
the lines of that provided for 12I  in Section 3 but based on the generalised Lorenz curve.  
Figure 5 plots the cumulative mean smoothed income (i.e. cumulated smoothed income 
divided by the total population) of the first 100q per cent of people when ranked from poorest 
to richest in the smoothed and original distributions, ( )
k
GL q  and ( )kGC q
 respectively, 
with  1,1S  simply equal to twice the area A if ( )
k
GC q  lies everywhere below the line of 
equality.  More generally,  1,S   is simply the generalised concentration index of the 
smoothed distribution 
k
Y 
 obtained by assigning to each individual in the population the 
income standard k
  of the group to which they belong, i.e. 
 1, 2cov( , ( ))
k
u b u uS G Y F Y
 

   .   
The sub-class of indices  1,S   thus provides a direct link between the measurement 
of stratification and between-group inequality and has the further advantage of a simple 
graphical representation using a familiar tool from stochastic dominance analysis.  Unlike 
 0,S  , the concept of stratification implied by  1,S   requires the joint presence of 
identification and alienation.  However  1,S   is not directly related to the distribution of 
disadvantage among groups, as pairwise alienation is simply given as the size of the income 
standard gap, which may not be an appropriate assumption in all cases. 
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Figure 5.  Representation of  1,1S  using generalised Lorenz and concentration curves 
 
 
4.6  Properties of  ,S    with 1    
All indices  ,S    with 1   have alienation functions that are convex functions of 
pairwise income standard gaps and are therefore directly sensitive to the distribution of 
disadvantage among pairs of groups.  For example, consider a population consisting of three 
equal sized groups with 
12 23I I , i.e. the middle group is equally identified with respect to 
the two other groups.  It then follows from Jensen’s inequality that stratification will be 
minimised if 2 1 3 2
         , i.e. the income standard of the middle group is also 
equidistant between those of the two other groups.  By implication, stratification will be 
higher in this population the closer the income standard of the middle group to that of either 
the richest or the poorest group, holding all other things constant.   
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Thus  ,S    reflects not only the incidence and depth but also the severity of 
stratification if 1  .  In particular, if 2   then the alienation function is equal to the 
squared income standard gap and one pair of groups with income standards twice as far apart 
as another pair will contribute four times as much to the stratification index holding all other 
factors equal.
14
  Higher values of   imply greater disadvantage aversion: in the limit as 
  then the value of the index will be dominated by the pairwise stratification between 
the richest and the poorest groups, with the poorest group − though not necessarily the 
poorest members of it − providing the most cost-effective target for an anti-stratification 
support policy.   
 
5. Discussion. 
The class of stratification indices    , ,kl kl klk l kS p A I      builds on links between 
the alternative definitions of the between-group Gini with each pairwise identification index 
klI  equal to the ratio of bG  to BG  in the sub-population consisting of groups k and l only, 
and  1,1S  identical to u bG  in the overall population.  In contrast, Yitzhaki (1994) builds 
on Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) to provide an alternative approach to the measurement of 
stratification based on the relationship between the alternative within-group Gini measures 
kkG  and kuG .  This section compares the relative merits of the two sets of measures and also 
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where          
2
var 1, varkl l k kl l kk l kA p D
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
      is the (unstandardized) 
co-skewness between the income standard gap and the identification index, and the last equality holds since 
      
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briefly considers the properties of two simple variants on  ,S    based on normalised 
versions of the alienation functions  ,klA   .  
 
5.1. Comparison with the Yitzhaki (1994) overlapping measures 
Yitzhaki (1994) shows that the within-group component wG  from the exact decomposition of 
the Gini index w bG G G   can be written as w k ku k kk kk kG s G s G O    where kO  denotes 
the ‘overlapping’ index of group k with the entire population.  In turn 
k l lkl
O p O  where 
the pairwise index    cov , ( ) cov , ( )lk k l k k k kO Y F Y Y F Y  lies in the open interval [0, 2] and is 
an increasing function of the fraction of group l that is located in the income range of group k.  
In other words, each 
lkO  measures the degree of ‘overlapping’ of group l by group k, where 
‘overlapping’ is interpreted as non-stratification in the sense of Lasswell (1965), and kO  is 
given as the population-weighted average of these indices.  The properties of the pairwise 
indices are fully expounded in Yitzhaki (1994) so discussion here is limited to the 
observation that the asymmetry of the pairwise indices, 
lkO  and klO , gives rise to problems 
of both interpretation and aggregation.   
With regard to interpretation, knowledge of the values of both 
lkO  and klO  is required 
to understand the relationship between the income distributions of the two groups.  In 
particular, a zero value of 
lkO  may arise either if the two distributions have no common 
support in which case 
klO  equals zero as well, or if all the incomes in group l are 
concentrated at a point in the income distribution of group k in which case 0klO   with klO
taking the maximum value of 2 when all group l incomes are equal to the group k mean 
income.  The first of these two cases corresponds in our framework to a state of perfect 
identification in which the unit-free index  0,klS   would equal one; while the limit of the 
second case implies zero stratification according to all  ,1klS   measures due to the complete 
absence of both identification and mean income-gap alienation.  Hence individual pairwise 
overlapping indices cannot really be interpreted as measuring pairwise stratification, and even 
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in combination can only be thus interpreted with care in the absence of clearly defined 
identification and alienation functions.  In contrast, pairwise stratification in our framework is 
based on explicit identification and alienation axioms that give rise to symmetric functions 
that are readily interpretable. 
The asymmetry of the pairwise indices also prevents aggregation to the population 
level, with the groupwise indices kO  capturing the extent of overlapping of the overall 
population distribution ( )u uF Y  by the group distribution ( )k kF Y , not the overall degree of 
overlapping per se.  In contrast our framework allows for the construction of both group 
 ,kS    and overall population  ,S    indices, where the contribution of any pairwise 
index  ,klS    to the value of each can be interpreted in a straightforward manner.  This is 
of considerable practical importance because it is therefore possible to judge not only 
whether the overall level of stratification is higher in one population compared to another but 
also to estimate the contribution of individual groups to observed levels of overall 
stratification with the further potential to identify the characteristics or factors that contribute to 
stratification.   
 
5.2 Normalisations 
We have already noted that the framework provides analysts and policymakers with the 
flexibility to evaluate stratification with varying sensitivity to distributional issues through the 
parameterisation of the alienation function.  Additionally, it is possible to normalise these 
functions so that alienation is not measured in absolute terms but in relative or standardised 
terms.  We consider two variants on  ,S    that normalise the absolute income standard gap 
 l k    with respect to the group l income standard l and the population average income 
standard gap D( ) , with both reducing to the unnormalised incidence measure  ,S    if 0  . 
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5.2.1 Relative stratification measures 
Treating the income standard of the richer group as the relevant “poverty line” in each 
pairwise comparison, it is possible to define a class of relative stratification gap measures: 
        , , P P ;l kkl kl kl kl l k k l
k l k k l k l
S p A I p Y Y Y Y
 

 
   
 
 
      
 
   (9) 
where  ,klA    captures the relative rather than the absolute disadvantage faced by the 
poorer group.  Both  ,klA    and  ,klA   may be interpreted as measures of the magnitude 
of relative deprivation inasmuch as they capture “the extent of the difference between the 
desired situation and that of the person desiring it” (Runciman, 1966, p.10), but the income 
standard gap is expressed in proportional terms in the case of  ,klA   .  This results in a 
stratification index  ,S   that is more sensitive to absolute differences in income standards 
between the poorest groups in the income distribution since the same income standard gap 
between two groups will contribute more to  ,S    the lower is the income standard of the 
richer of the two groups with the level of identification held constant.  For example, consider 
again the example of a population consisting of three equal sized groups with the middle 
group equally identified with respect to the two other groups then stratification will be 
maximised if  2 1 3 1 3 2           , i.e. the income standard of the middle group 
is closer to the bottom than the top group.  Thus, in contrast to  1,S  ,  1,S   is not 
invariant to the distribution of absolute income standard gaps among pairs of groups all other 
things equal, nor is it symmetric to the distribution of income standard gaps about the overall 
mean unlike higher-order  ,S    measures.   
By definition,  ,S    are unit free measures that are invariant to the scalar 
transformation of welfare levels and bounded from above by unity.  These properties may 
prove particularly useful for the comparison of (relative) stratification gaps either over time 
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or across countries.   ,S    will be a decreasing function of the disadvantage aversion 
parameter   as with FGT poverty measures. 
 
5.2.2 Standardised stratification measures 
It may also be useful to normalise each income standard gap by the population-weighted mean 
income standard gap, to yield a class of standardised stratification gap measures: 
        , , P P ;
( )
l k
kl kl kl kl l k k l
k l k k l k
S p A I p Y Y Y Y
D
  
   
 
 
      
 
   (10) 
where the standardised alienation function  ,klA    is unit free.   
In particular if 1   then the normalised index may be written as:  
   
 
 
1, 1, ;
k l l k
kl kl kl kl kl kl
k l k k l k k l kk l l k
k l k
p p
S p A I I w I
p p
 
 
 
 
   


  

  

 (11) 
where the weights klw  are non-negative and sum to unity.  Thus  1,S   may be interpreted 
as a weighted average identification index like  0,S   but with pairwise weights equal to 
shares in the total income standard gap  ND  .  It is easily shown that  1,S   is equal to 
 0,S   plus  cov( 1, , )kl klA I  where the covariance between the standardised alienation 
function and pairwise identification indices may be expected to be positive.  Like  0,S  , 
 1,S   is invariant to affine transformations of income but also to the replication of 
population by the replication of groups.  Allanson (2014) has previously identified  1,S  as 
the ratio of bG  to BG , given that the denominator in the weights function is simply equal to 
0.5 u BG , with Heller and Yitzhaki (2006) interpreting this ratio as a measure the ‘quality of 
identification’ achieved in the classification of individual groups by means of some 
continuous characteristic. 
By extension,  ,S    may in general be interpreted as a class of weighted 
identification indices where the form of the weighting functions    , ,kl kl klw p A   
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resembles those employed in the definition of the class of general additive decomposable 
(GAD) inequality indices (Foster and Shneyerov, 1999) but specified in terms of mean 
normalised differences in income standards between pairs of groups, rather than mean 
normalised income standards of individual groups, since the concern is to measure the 
distance between distributions.  However it should be noted that the resultant weights only 
sum to one if either 0   or 1  , as is also the case with GAD inequality indices. 
 
6. Empirical illustration. 
By way of illustration, this section follows Allanson (2014) in further elaborating the 
empirical analysis presented in Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) of world inequality by regions 
in 1993.
15
  The top panel in Table 1 presents estimates from their Tables 4 and 7 of 
population shares, kp ; mean incomes, k ; and mean rankings in the income distributions of 
each region,  kl k lF P Y Y  , and the world  ku k uF P Y Y  .  This shows that Africa was the 
poorest region in per capita terms followed by Asia; Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union (EFSU); Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); and Western Europe/North 
America/Oceania (WENAO).  However the mean rank of Africans in the Asian income 
distribution was 0.515, implying that an African chosen at random was likely to have been 
better off than a randomly chosen Asian, and the mean rank of Africans in the world 
distribution was also higher than that of Asians.  Mean ranks for all other pairs of regions are 
consistent with the ordering of mean incomes.  
 The remaining panels show the constituent elements of the stratification indices as 
identified in the last line of (2), with the stratification indices themselves given in Table 2.  
Note that the population weights / ( )kl k k lp p p p  reflect the relative frequencies of distinct 
regional pairs and do not sum across columns to give the population shares kp .  The pattern 
of pairwise signed identification indices sgn( ) kll k I  and absolute mean income gaps 
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 These regions are referred to as ‘continents’ in Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) though the correspondence is 
not exact.  
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l k   reveals that the regions of the world are broadly divided into three broad layers or 
strata – with Africa and Asia at the bottom, EFSU and LAC in the middle and WENAO on its 
own at the top of the world income distribution – where the degree of both identification and 
alienation between regions in the same layer was much lower than that between regions in 
different strata.  Indeed, there was virtually no stratification of the African and Asian 
distributions in the bottom stratum nor of the EFSU and LAC distributions in the middle 
layer, with pairwise identifications indices close to zero and mean income gaps less than 
$1000.  In contrast, the WENAO income distribution was highly stratified from those of 
every other region, with the relevant pairwise identification indices ranging between 0.656 
and 0.902 and all mean income gaps greater than twice the mean world income level of 
$3000.  All other pairwise measures were intermediate with the population-weighted mean 
identification index and mean income gap equal to 0.518 and $4007 respectively.   
 The top panel of Table 2 reports the headcount index (0,1)S , which is equal to the 
population-weighted mean identification index reported in Table 1.  Thus the difference in 
the odds that the income of a randomly chosen member of a richer region was more rather 
than less than that of a randomly selected member of a poorer region was equal to 0.518.  It  
follows immediately that the population-weighted mean probability of transvariation was 
equal to 0.241.  The pairwise decomposition shows that the overall level of identification was 
mainly driven by the existence of the largely separate WENAO stratum at the top of the 
world income distribution, with the Asia/WENAO pair alone contribute nearly half of the  
total value of (0,1)S 16 as a result of the populousness of the two regions and the low degree of 
overlap between their income distributions.  At the other extreme, the EFSU/LAC and 
Africa/Asia pairs made a negligible contribution to the total due to the lack of pairwise 
identification of their income distributions, with the negative value of the latter arising 
because the probability of transvariation between the two regions, i.e.  Africa AsiaP Y Y , was 
greater than 0.5.    
                                                          
16
 Since (0.0475+0.1981)/0.518=0.474. 
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Table 1.  Constituent elements of income stratification calculations 
 
Pop
n
 
share  
(%) 
Mean 
income 
($PPP) Mean rank in income distribution of: 
Column (l) 
Row (k)   
Africa 
 
Asia 
 
EFSU 
 
LAC 
 
WENAO 
 
World 
 
Africa 10.0 1310.0 0.500 0.515 0.275 0.261 0.049 0.407 
Asia 59.5 1594.6 0.485 0.500 0.265 0.247 0.064 0.397 
EFSU 7.8 2780.9 0.725 0.735 0.500 0.483 0.136 0.609 
LAC 8.4 3639.8 0.739 0.753 0.517 0.500 0.172 0.629 
WENAO 14.3 10012.4 0.951 0.936 0.864 0.828 0.500 0.861 
World 100.0 3031.8      0.500 
   Population weights: ( )kl k k lp p p p  Sum 
Africa   ~ 0.029 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.078 
Asia   0.169 ~ 0.136 0.146 0.227 0.678 
EFSU   0.011 0.018 ~ 0.010 0.013 0.053 
LAC   0.013 0.021 0.011 ~ 0.015 0.060 
WENAO   0.028 0.055 0.024 0.025 ~ 0.131 
World        1.000 
Signed pairwise identification indices: sgn( ) kll k I  
Weighted
mean 
Africa   ~ -0.030 0.450 0.478 0.902 0.393 
Asia   -0.030 ~ 0.470 0.506 0.872 0.488 
EFSU   0.450 0.470 ~ 0.034 0.728 0.443 
LAC   0.478 0.506 0.034 ~ 0.656 0.448 
WENAO   0.902 0.872 0.728 0.656 ~ 0.811 
World        0.518 
   Absolute mean income gaps: l k   
Weighted
mean 
Africa   ~ 284.6 1470.9 2329.8 8702.4 3021.7 
Asia   284.6 ~ 1186.3 2045.2 8417.8 3567.8 
EFSU   1470.9 1186.3 ~ 858.9 7231.5 2678.7 
LAC   2329.8 2045.2 858.9 ~ 6372.6 2957.0 
WENAO   8702.4 8417.8 7231.5 6372.6 ~ 7871.9 
World        4007.4 
Notes: Top panel. Source: Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) Tables 4 and 7 - see also Table 1 for the list of 
countries in each region (EFSU – Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union; LAC – Latin America and 
Caribbean; WENAO – Western Europe, North America and Oceania).  Other panels.  Author’s own 
calculations. 
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Table 2.  Income stratification between regions of the world 
  Africa Asia EFSU LAC WENAO Sum Share 
Headcount stratification 
Africa  ~ -0.0009 0.0066 0.0073 0.0177 0.031 5.9% 
Asia  -0.0051 ~ 0.0639 0.0738 0.1981 0.331 63.9% 
EFSU  0.0051 0.0084 ~ 0.0004 0.0095 0.023 4.5% 
LAC  0.0061 0.0105 0.0004 ~ 0.0097 0.027 5.2% 
WENAO  0.0252 0.0475 0.0174 0.0165 ~ 0.107 20.6% 
 S 0,1        0.518  
Stratification gap $PPP  
Africa  ~ -0.2 9.7 17.0 153.8 180.2 5.8% 
Asia  -1.4 ~ 75.8 150.8 1667.7 1892.9 60.9% 
EFSU  7.5 9.9 ~ 0.3 68.6 86.4 2.8% 
LAC  14.3 21.4 0.3 ~ 62.0 98.0 3.2% 
WENAO  218.9 400.2 125.7 104.9 ~ 849.7 27.3% 
 S 1,1        3107.2  
Relative stratification gap   
Africa  ~ -0.0002 0.0035 0.0047 0.0154 0.023 6.3% 
Asia  -0.0009 ~ 0.0273 0.0414 0.1666 0.234 63.0% 
EFSU  0.0027 0.0036 ~ 0.0001 0.0069 0.013 3.6% 
LAC  0.0039 0.0059 0.0001 ~ 0.0062 0.016 4.3% 
WENAO  0.0219 0.0400 0.0126 0.0105 ~ 0.085 22.8% 
 S 1,1        0.372  
Standardised stratification gap   
Africa  ~ -0.0001 0.0024 0.0042 0.0384 0.045 5.8% 
Asia  -0.0004 ~ 0.0189 0.0376 0.4161 0.472 60.9% 
EFSU  0.0019 0.0025 ~ 0.0001 0.0171 0.022 2.8% 
LAC  0.0036 0.0053 0.0001 ~ 0.0155 0.024 3.2% 
WENAO  0.0546 0.0999 0.0314 0.0262 ~ 0.212 27.3% 
 S 1,1        0.775  
Squared stratification gap ($PPP/1000)
2
 
Africa  ~ -0.0001 0.0142 0.0395 1.3385 1.392 5.9% 
Asia  -0.0004 ~ 0.0900 0.3085 14.0381 14.436 61.0% 
EFSU  0.0110 0.0118 ~ 0.0003 0.4964 0.519 2.2% 
LAC  0.0332 0.0437 0.0003 ~ 0.3951 0.472 2.0% 
WENAO  1.9053 3.3684 0.9089 0.6688 ~ 6.851 28.9% 
 S 2,1        23.671  
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
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 The second panel reports the stratification gap index (1,1)S  which also reflects the 
depth of stratification and may loosely be interpreted as a measure of the perceived average 
difference in mean incomes between regions based on individuals’ actual positions in the 
world income distribution, where this would only equal the actual average mean income gap 
if all regional income distributions were fully identified such that the probability of 
transvariation was zero.  Thus the stratification gap of $3107 may be compared to the mean 
income gap  1D  of $4007 reported in Table 1, with the difference reflecting the odds that a 
randomly chosen individual in a poorer region had a higher income than a randomly selected 
individual in a richer region.  Alternatively, following Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002), the 
difference of $900 represents the loss of absolute between-group inequality due to the 
overlapping of regional income distributions since  1 u BD G  and (1,1) u bS G .  In 
comparison to (0,1)S , WENAO accounts for an even larger share of the total value of the 
index as a result of the above-average mean income differences between WENAO and every 
other region in the world.  In contrast, the shares of the “middle income” regions, EFSU and 
LAC, fall particularly sharply as a result of their intermediate position in the world income 
distribution and correspondingly lower mean income gaps compared to other regions. 
 The next two panels present results on the alternative normalisations of (1,1)S .  The 
relative stratification gap index (1,1)S  was 0.372, which may be interpreted as the perceived 
average relative difference in mean incomes between regions based on individuals’ actual 
positions in the world income distribution.  (1,1)S  is less than the headcount index (0,1)S  by 
construction, since the pairwise mean income gaps reported in Table 1 are all strictly positive.  
The pairwise decomposition shows increases in the relative contributions of all regions 
except WENAO compared to those for (1,1)S , reflecting the greater sensitivity of relative 
stratification gap indices to income standard gaps between pairs of groups at the bottom of 
the income distribution.  In other words, (1,1)S  gives more weight than (1,1)S  to differences in 
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mean incomes between the poorer regions of the world in the calculation of the overall 
measure of the stratification gap. 
 The standardised stratification gap index (1,1)S  was 0.775 and, like (0,1)S , may be 
interpreted as a weighted average identification index but with total income gap rather than 
population weights.  Given that  (1,1) (0,1) cov( 1, , )kl klS S A I  , the larger value of (1,1)S  
reflects the positive correlation between pairwise mean income gaps and identification 
indices, i.e. region pairs that formed more clearly defined regional strata in their combined 
income distribution also tended to have had larger differences in mean incomes.  The value of 
the index may also be identified, following Allanson (2014), as the ratio of bG  to BG , with 
0.775=3107/4007.  The pairwise decomposition is identical to (1,1)S  but differs from that 
given in Allanson (2014) who splits pairwise contributions equally between regions rather 
than by population shares. 
 The final panel reports the squared stratification gap (2,1)S  which was 23.6 million 
dollars squared.  The squared measure puts greater weight on larger mean income gaps 
compared to (1,1)S  leading, as expected, to increases in the relative contributions of the 
regions at the top and bottom of the world income distribution – WENAO, Africa and Asia – 
at the expense of those in the middle – EFSU and LAC.  Higher-order indices (i.e. with 2)   
would place increasingly greater weight on the relative contributions of the regions at the top 
and bottom of the world income distribution, with the pairwise stratification between the 
poorest and richest regions dominating the value of the index in the limit. 
 Overall the various stratification indices all portray a broadly similar picture of the 
pattern of stratification given that the correlation coefficient between the pairwise 
identification indices and mean income gaps was equal to 0.88.  We have argued that 
stratification necessarily results in both pairwise identification and alienation so this positive 
correlation is to be expected but the strength of the association will likely differ depending on 
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the specific nature of the process under consideration.  In any case, reporting a range of 
indices serves to provide a fuller characterisation of the nature of stratification given that each 
individual measure has a clear and distinct interpretation in terms of the outcomes of the 
process.  Recalling that a ceteris paribus increase in within-group inequality will (typically) 
reduce stratification, the combination in some poorer Asian countries, most notably China 
and India, of high per capita growth rates and the emergence of prosperous middle classes 
may be expected to have reduced overall levels of both alienation and identification between 
regions in more recent years.
17
 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper offers a new class of indices that is based on a conceptualisation of stratification 
as a process that results in a hierarchical ordering of groups and therefore seeks to capture not 
only the extent to which groups form well-defined layers or strata in the income distribution 
but also the scale of the resultant differences in income standards between them, where these 
two factors play the same role as identification and alienation respectively in the 
measurement of polarisation (Esteban and Ray, 1994; Duclos et al., 2004).  One important 
difference is that pairwise identification in our approach is equal to the difference in the odds 
that the income of a randomly chosen member of the richer group is more rather than less 
than that of a randomly selected member of the poorer group, rather than being a function of 
relative frequencies within income classes or at particular levels of income.  Moreover, 
alienation between pairs of groups is defined as a power function of the absolute difference in 
income standards between them, providing a parametric class of measures that may be used 
by analysts and policymakers to evaluate the impact of differing degrees of inequality and 
disadvantage aversion on stratification.  
                                                          
17
  See Milanovic (2012) and Lakner and Milanovic (2013) for further discussion and evidence on trends in 
between-country inequality. 
39 
 
The main theoretical advantage of the proposed class of indices over existing 
measures of interdistributional inequality is that the indices are applicable to multiple groups 
and yet provide more information than ethical distance functions.  The dominance properties 
of the indices are similar to those of the Duclos et al. (2004) polarisation measures.  First the 
identification axiom distinguishes stratification from inequality since an income standard-
preserving “squeeze” in the welfare distribution of one group cannot reduce identification 
under certain specified conditions whereas it will lead to a fall in inequality according to the 
Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.  More straightforwardly, an identification-preserving scalar 
expansion of all welfare differences about the overall population income standard will 
unambiguously increase alienation and hence stratification.  Finally stratification will 
typically be maximised if the population is equally divided between the richest and poorest 
groups.  However it is important to recognise that stratification is not the same as polarisation 
due to the different characterisations of identification employed in the two sets of measures, 
with an axiomatic derivation of the proposed class of stratification measures remaining a 
topic for further research.  The link between the stratification gap measure and the 
generalised Lorenz curve further suggests that it may be possible to establish welfare 
foundations for at least some members of the new class of indices.  
The other major attraction of the proposed class of measures is their ease of 
interpretation and practical utility.  In particular, the headcount or incidence measure gives 
the odds that the income of a randomly chosen member of a richer group is more rather than 
less than that of a randomly selected member of a poorer group, while the stratification gap 
also reflects the depth of stratification and index and may be interpreted as a measure of the 
perceived average difference in income standards between groups based on individuals’ 
actual positions in the world income distribution.  Each index is a population-weighted 
average of pairwise indices so it is possible to estimate the contribution of individual groups 
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to observed levels of overall stratification with the further potential to identify the 
characteristics or factors that contribute to stratification.  Reporting a range of measures rather 
than just one enables a fuller characterisation of the nature of stratification as shown by the 
illustrative study of global stratification in this paper.  Estimation and inference procedures 
remain an issue for future work, with the Frick et al. (2006) estimator of the Yitzhaki and 
Lerman (1991) between-group Gini index providing a possible starting point.  Given suitable 
procedures, it would be of interest to examine changes in global stratification over time as 
well as consider applications to a range of other socioeconomic phenomena such as the racial 
wage hierarchy in South Africa and gender pay differentials in earnings.   
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